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Mathematical Impossibility in History and in theClassroom1
Jesper LützenDepartment of Mathematical Sciences, University of CopenhagenDenmarklutzen@math.ku.dk
AbstractTheorems stating that something is impossible are notoriously difficult to under-stand for many students and amateur mathematicians. In this talk I shall discusshow the role of such impossibility statements has changed during the history ofmathematics. I shall argue that impossibility statements have changed status froma kind of meta-statement to true mathematical theorems. I shall also argue thatthis story is worth telling in the classroom because it will clarify the nature ofimpossibility theorems and thus of mathematics. In particular it will show to thestudents how mathematics is able to investigate the limits of its own activity withits own methods.Key wordsPhilosophy, Mathematics Education, History of Mathematics.
1 Impossibility, the noble quest
To accomplish the impossible is the most ambitious quest one can have in life. This isthe central message one will get if one searches the web for quotations on “impossibility.Here is a brief list of such quotes accessible from (thinkexist.com, 2011):“The impossible - what nobody can do until somebody does”“Start by doing what´s necessary; then do what´s possible; and suddenly you aredoing the impossible.” (St Francis of Assisi)“The impossible is often the untried.”“ Impossible is not a scientific term.”“The Wright brothers flew right through the smoke screen of impossibility.”"Every noble work is at first impossible" (Thomas Carlyle)“Impossible only means that you havent found the solution yet.”“I love those who yearn for the impossible.” (Goethe)
1 Este trabajo corresponde a una conferencia paralela dictada en la XIII CIAEM, celebrada en Recife,Brasil el año 2011.
Cuadernos de Investigación y Formación en Educación Matemática. 2013. Año 8. Número 11. pp 165-174. Costa Rica
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166 Lützen
“Its kind of fun to do the impossible.” (Walt Disney)“Nothing is impossible. . . It is often merely for an excuse that we say that things areimpossible” (Duc de La Rochefoucauld)“Impossible is a word to be found only in the dictionary of fools.” (Napoléon)I shall not vouch for the accuracy of the quotes. I only cite them to give an impressionof a consistent popular view of the impossible. With such a view in mind it is quitenatural that many amateur mathematicians have tried to square the circle or trisect theangle. And it is also clear that the attitude of professional mathematicians must seemextraordinarily arrogant to them. Not only do the professional mathematician claimthat the problems are impossible, they also claim that they know in advance that thesolution presented by the amateur must be wrong and therefore hardly bother to lookat it!What the amateur usually has not understood is1. that mathematical impossibility theorems do not claim that a problem is impossible tosolve in general, but only that it is impossible to solve with a particular type of methodsand within a particular well defined framework. In fact mathematicians often have theaudacity to claim that clearly unsolvable problems such as the equation x2 + 1 = 0have solutions after all if the domain of enquiry is extended far enough. In this waythey behave just like the people quoted above.2. that mathematicians do not just claim that because they have not been able to finda solution it must be impossible but that they have a proof of the impossibility.These misunderstandings are not new. Already in 1778 Condorcet wrote that “a massof people, many more than one thinks, renounce their useful job in order to abandonthemselves to the research of these problems” (Condorcet 1778). The problems hereferred to was the quadrature of the circle, the duplication of the cube and the trisectionof the angle, and the occasion was the decision made in 1775 by the Académie desSciences to stop reviewing solutions of these problems.The hope was that this step combined with the enlightening work of Montucla (1754)would dissuade amateur mathematicians from wasting their time solving the problems.It is well known that the effort did not work. Circle squarers continued their futilework for centuries. Still, at least in Denmark the last decades have experienced agreat decline in the number of circle squarers who address their purported solutionsto the universities. Is this a delayed result of the enlightenment that Condorcet andhis fellow philosophers opted for? I am afraid not. Without having made a statisticalinvestigation I am convinced that the diminished interest in the classical problems isnot due to more knowledge about the problems. On the contrary, it seems rather to bethe result of ignorance. Fewer children learn a sufficient amount of geometry in schoolto ever encounter the problems, and thus they are not tempted to try to solve them.So in this case ignorance has had a more positive influence on the problem thanenlightenment. Still, I think that there are good reasons to prefer enlightenment evenif it might create more circle squarers. In fact, I think that impossibility theorems havea place in the classroom at least at high school level. To be sure such theorems do
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Mathematical Impossibility in History and in the Classroom 167
not teach the students to solve more mathematical problems, but they will teach themthat one cannot solve all problems with a given method. This is in itself an importantlesson that can be of help to those who learn mathematics in order to use it in theirlater profession.Impossibility theorems have even more important lessons to teach those students whowant or need to learn something about the nature of mathematics. In particular, itis important for the students to understand how mathematics has been able to dealwith its own limits using its own methods. This is rather unique to mathematics. Inmost other areas of life a solution of a problem and a statement of its impossibility aretwo very different types of statement and they call for different methods. For exampletake the problem of flight alluded to in one of the impossibility quotes above. Here asolution was an engineering accomplishment namely the construction of an airplane.An impossibility argument might have relied on fundamental physics or philosophy butcould of course never have been an engineering construction.Another lesson to be learned from impossibility theorems in mathematics is the utmostprecision required to make this type of statements meaningful and true. For example itis not enough to state that the classical problems are impossible, One must state thatthe problems are only impossible if one requires that they be constructed by ruler andcompass, and one even has to make quite precise what one is allowed to do with theruler and the compass. One can only draw a straight line between two given pointsand a circle with given center and radius. And one can consider all intersection pointsarising in this way as new given points. One is not allowed to make a so-called neusisconstruction although such a construction is in a sense made by a ruler.
2 Are impossibility theorems something special?
While many amateur mathematicians have tried to disprove the theorem stating theimpossibility of the quadrature of the circle there have been few who have tried todisprove positively formulated mathematical theorems such as Pythagoras’ theorem.This alone suggests that impossibility theorems play a special role. Is it only themathematician’s know-all attitude displayed in impossibility theorems that provokethe amateur or are there other differences between impossibility theorems and othertheorems?If we consider mathematics as a collection of theorems it is hardly possible to distin-guish impossibility statements from other mathematical statements. An impossibilitystatement usually says that something does not exist. Such a statement has the form:
¬∃x : p(x)
According to the usual rules of logic this statement is equivalent to the universalstatement: ∀x : ¬p(x)For example Fermat’s last theorem, which is usually stated as the impossibility ofsolving the equation xn + yn = zn in natural numbers when n is larger than 2, can
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168 Lützen
just as well be formulated as the universal statement:
∀x, y, z, n ∈ N : n > 2⇒ xn + yn 6= zn.
In this way there seem to be no logical difference between impossibility theorems andother theorems.But it is a fact that certain theorems are usually formulated as impossibility theoremsand are recognized as such by amateur and professional mathematicians alike. Howcan that be? In order to answer that question it is important to distinguish two differentways of looking at mathematics: It can be considered as a theorem proving enterpriseand also as a problem solving enterprise. As we have seen the distinction betweenimpossibility statements and universal positive statements is not clear from a theoremproving point of view. However, if mathematics is considered as a problem solvingenterprise there is a clear distinction between finding a solution of a problem andproving that a solution is impossible. And all famous impossibility theorems do indeedstate the impossibility of solving a problem that might at first sight seem solvable.This distinction between solutions of problems and impossibility statements seems tobe partly responsible for the fact that many amateur mathematicians do not realizethat impossibility statements can be proved just as other mathematical theorems. Anda view of the history of impossibility theorems will reveal that in earlier periods evenfirst rate mathematicians have considered some types of impossibility theorems as akind of meta-theorems that are not amenable to proof. This aspect of the history ofimpossibility theorems seem to me to be one of the major reasons why the history ofimpossibility theorems can help shed light on the nature of these theorems in a classroom.
3 Impossibility statements as meta statements
The classical construction problems mentioned above were formulated quite early inthe history of Greek mathematics (Katz 2009). They were all solved by various meansbut no construction with the Euclidean tools of ruler and compass were found. It hasbeen discussed when and how strictly the Greeks formulated a preference for rulerand compass constructions but with the late Greek philosopher mathematician Pappus(about 340 AD) a strictly normative requirement of simplicity of constructions wasformulated (Pappus, see in particular book III chapter VII and book VI chapter XXXVI).According to Pappus a problem is plane if it can be solved by ruler and compass, andit will be a serious methodological mistake to solve such a problem using other means.According to Pappus the trisection of an angle and the duplication of a cube are solidproblems. This means they can be solved by intersection of conic sections, but theycannot be solved with ruler and compass. He provided proofs of the positive parts of thestatements, i.e. that the problems can be constructed by intersections of conic sections,but the impossibility of solving the problems with ruler and compass remained just apostulate. He mentioned that previous attempts of constructing the two problems byplane means had failed, but it is also clear that when he claimed that the problemswere not plane, he meant more than just this empirical fact. He made it clear that the
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
Mathematical Impossibility in History and in the Classroom 169
problems were somehow in principle unsolvable by plane means and even poked fun ofan unnamed colleague who had tried to solve the problems by ruler and compass. Andyet he never even indicated that he considered this impossibility as a fact that calledfor a mathematical proof.This indicates that Pappus considered these impossibility statements as a kind ofmeta-mathematical statements: a statement about the mathematical problem solvingenterprise but a statement that in itself is not a mathematical theorem. Mathematics isstill full of such statements. For example we may state about a proof that it is elegantor about a theorem that it is important and no-one will dream of asking us to proveour statements.One can point to a similar situation in the history of the solvability of polynomialequations by radicals. Here Lagrange (1770/71) made a great effort of analyzing themethod of solving equations of degree 2,3 and 4 in order to generalize the method toobtain a solution of equations of higher degree. His analyses of the previous methodswere penetrating and yet they did not lead him to a method of solving the quintic.He still decided to publish his results because he hoped that his successors might putthem to use in the solution of the quintic if such a solution existed (Lagrange, 1770/71,pp. 355, 357, 403). It is interesting that he explicitly mentioned the possibility thatthe quintic might be unsolvable by radicals, and equally interesting that he did notsuggest that his methods might be of help in proving this impossibility. A few yearslater (1799) Ruffini attempted just that (Ruffini, 1915) but Lagrange did not bother torespond to his attempts.
4 The lack of importance of impossibility results
This indicates that even when Lagrange was made aware of the possibility of provingthe impossibility he did not consider it particularly interesting. In fact there are otherhistorical instances where impossibility results have been overlooked or even explicitlydenounced as unimportant: One example is connected to Fermat’s formulation of im-possibility theorems in number theory. Today he is most famous for his last theorem,but he actually formulated and in one case proved other impossibility results such asthe impossibility of forming a right angled triangle with integer sides and an area thatis a square number. As pointed out by Goldstein (1995, 136) Fermat’s contemporariesdid not think highly of this type of theorem. To them mathematics was about solvingproblems not about finding problems that cannot be solved. For example Wallis wroteabout Fermat: “I do not see why he mentions them [negative propositions] as thingsof a surprising difficulty. It is easy to think of innumerable negative determinations ofthis sort" (Wallis, 1657, quoted in Goldstein, 1995)A similar view can be detected in Gauss’s dealing with the construction of regularn-gons (Gauss, 1801). He proved in detail how to construct a regular n-gon by rulerand compass if n is of the form 2kp1p2 . . . pi where k is a natural number or zero andp1, p2, . . . , pi are different Fermat primes, i.e. primes of the form 22j + 1. He alsoclaimed that he could prove that the regular n-gon was impossible to construct withruler and compass if n is not of this form. However, he did not include his proof in the
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book. Today we consider this impossibility theorem as at least as interesting as thepositive constructive part of Gauss’ theorem, but apparently Gauss considered it lessimportant, or perhaps he just thought that his contemporaries would consider it lessimportant.In (Lützen, 2009) I have shown that Wantzels proof from 1837 of the impossibilityof constructing the duplication of the cube and the trisection of the angle by rulerand compass was almost overlooked for a century even though it settled these twovery famous classical problems. Again this seems to indicate that such impossibilitytheorems were still considered as less important than positive theorems even as lateas the beginning of the 19th century.
5 A surge of impossibility results
However, the period around 1830 saw a surge in impossibility theorems. In additionto Wantzel’s impossibility proof the most famous is Abel’s proof of the impossibility ofsolving the quintic by radicals (Abel, 1824) and Liouville’s proofs that one cannot findcertain integrals in finite terms or integrate certain differential equations by quadrature(i.e. in expressed in terms of indefinite integrals) (Lützen, 1990). Wantzel himself wroteseveral other papers on impossibility results. For example he established that it isimpossible to avoid the use of complex numbers when one expresses the roots of acubic equation with three real roots in terms of radicals (Wantzel, 1843). MoreoverFermat’s last theorem was proved around 1830 for n = 5 and 7 by Legendre, Dirichletand Lamé (Katz, 2009).However as I pointed out above Wantzel’s proofs were not really appreciated at thetime and the same holds true for Liouville’s results that were only taken up again morethan half a century later.
6 The difficulty of the parallel postulate
The story of the emergence of non-Euclidean geometry is also the story of impossibility,namely the impossibility of proving the parallel postulate from the other axioms ofgeometry. However, the story shows how difficult it was to realize that such animpossibility could be proved. In fact the proof presented itself in a somewhat backwardway and at first it was not generally accepted as a proof at all. In fact when Gauss,Lobachevsky and Bolyai developed their non-Euclidean geometry they had no proofthat the parallel postulate was not a consequence of the other postulates and thereforedid not really know that their new geometry was consistent at all.The road to the proof of the independence of the parallel postulate was opened in1868 by Beltrami who used Gauss’ theory of surfaces to show that a surface of con-stant negative curvature did indeed possess a non-Euclidean geometry if geodesics areplaying the role of straight lines. He realized such a surface as the an open circulardisc equipped with a suitable metric. The surface of constant negative curvature is nowconsidered a model of non-Euclidean geometry and it is used to argue for the relative
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consistency of non-Euclidean geometry. The argument goes as follows: an inconsis-tency in non-Euclidean geometry would turn up in the model as an inconsistency inEuclidean geometry in which the surface of constant negative curvature lives. Thus ifEuclidean geometry is consistent non-Euclidean geometry is consistent as well. Thisway of putting the consistency argument was explicitly put forward by Poincaré in1902 in La Science et l’Hypothèse. But when Beltrami first presented what he calleda real substrate for non-Euclidean geometry it was not immediately realized that itimplied the impossibility of proving the parallel postulate. As documented by Voelke(2005) Beltrami himself took some time to draw this conclusion and some of his lessprominent contemporaries interpreted it very differently. They took Beltrami’s modelas evidence that Euclidean geometry was indeed the only correct geometry. To themBeltrami’s model showed that Gauss, Lobachevsky and Bolyai had not found a newgeometry. They had only developed a geometry of geodesics on a surface in Euclideanspace.This story show how difficult it was for Beltrami and his contemporaries to appreciatethe model as a method for proving independence of an axiom. I cannot tell if this isa suitable story to tell to high school students, but it is useful knowledge to theirteachers, because it exemplifies the problems the students may have in understandingthe meaning of impossibility proofs.
7 Impossibility theorems become main stream
Today impossibility theorems have obtained a central place in mathematics. Indeedmany of the most celebrated mathematical results are impossibility theorems. Thishappened around 1900. Already Abel (1839) had emphasized that his predecessors hadmade a mistake by posing the problem: Find the solution by radicals of the quintic.Instead Abel suggested that the right question to pose is: Is the quintic solvable byradicals? Only if this question could be answered in the positive could one then go onto ask the question of finding the solution. By changing the problem in this way Abelclaimed that all mathematical problems would have answers (Abel, 1839).Three quarters of a century later Hilbert in his famous lecture on mathematical problems(Hilbert 1900) rephrased this idea. According to Hilbert one must count an impossibilityproof as a kind of solution to a problem. In this way all mathematical problems couldbe solved either by a proof of impossibility or by exhibiting a solution. In mathematicsthere is no Ignorabimus, as Hilbert famously claimed. He remarked that this decidabilitypostulate was not proved, but he based his claim on general philosophical grounds.In this way impossibility results obtained their full citizenship in mathematics. By theirony of fate the next major impossibility theorem showed that Hilbert was mistaken.Theorems by Turing and Gödel showed that in a sufficiently rich mathematical systemthere are in fact problems that cannot be solved or proven to be impossible.
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8 Different kinds of impossibility results
We have seen that some impossibility results have been considered as meta-statementsabout mathematics rather than as true mathematical statements. At first this may soundstrange. After all the first impossibility theorems are ancient. Probably the first proof ofimpossibility is the famous proof of the incommensurability of the side and the diagonalin a square. It shows that it is impossible to find a line segment that measures boththe side and the diagonal a whole number of times.With that in mind one might suppose that it would be rather obvious to later Greekmathematicians that one could prove other impossibility statements for example theimpossibility of constructing the classical problems using only ruler and compass. Andlater in the 19th century after one had proven these impossibilities and the impossibilityof solving the quintic by radicals it may seem strange that it seemed so difficult toaccept a proof of impossibility of proving the parallel postulate.In order to understand these difficulties I think one must distinguish different kinds ofimpossibility statements. The distinction I shall introduce goes according to the thingthat is claimed to be impossible or non-existent. In the simplest case, for examplein the case of the incommensurability or Fermat’s last theorem it is an object of thetheory that does not exist (such as a common unit of the side and the diagonal of asquare). On the next level it is a construction or an algorithm in the theory that doesnot exist (for example a construction by ruler and compass or an algorithm using onlyradicals and rational operations). A third level deals with the non-existence of a proofin a theory (for example of the parallel postulate) and the fourth level deals with theimpossibility of a proof about a theory (for example that every problem has a solutionin Hilbert’s sense).Historically there is evidence that these levels are increasingly difficult to accept astreatable by mathematical means. We have seen that at a given time impossibilitytheorems of a particular level could be considered as amenable to mathematical proofwhereas impossibility statements of higher levels were considered as meta-statements.I think that this observation may help teachers to understand the difficulties of theirstudents in coming to terms with the nature of impossibility statements.
9 Impossibility in the classroom
There are good reasons to teach the students at least in high school about the limitsof mathematics. There are different kinds of limits: one kind has to do with the limitsof a mathematical model of a phenomenon in nature or society. This type of limitsis not treatable with purely mathematical methods and I shall not discuss them anyfurther here. The other type of limits is the kind I have discussed in this paper, namelythe inability of solving a mathematical problem with a given mathematical method andwithin a given mathematical system. As mentioned above it is desirable to teach thestudents that there are such limits and to explain that they can be investigated withmathematical methods. However, many of the most striking impossibility theoremsdealing with these limits are mathematically too difficult to prove in a high school
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class. Fermat’s last theorem, Gödel’s theorems and even the quadrature of the circleare certainly beyond this level. The impossibility of proving the parallel postulate isperhaps within reach and so is the impossibility of the duplication of the cube and thetrisection of the angle. Many years ago I wrote a book for the Danish high school inwhich I went through the history of the classical problems. In this book I also includeda rather elementary proof that the duplication of the cube and the trisection of theangle are impossible by ruler and compass (Lützen, 1985). Some teachers workedthrough the proof with their high school classes and reported that it was difficult butvery rewarding at least for the good students.But if such a proof is too hard to present to the students one can also convey themessage by telling the history of one or more of the famous impossibility theoremswithout going into detail with the proofs and give a baby example of an impossibilitytheorem. The following example has successfully been used by my colleague MogensEsrom Larsen when he was faced with circle squarers:The problem is to find a natural number whose square has a remainder 3 when dividedby 4. Here the students may begin to check the squares of the natural numbersbeginning with 1 in order to find their remainders modulo 4. They will probably soondiscover that the remainders are apparently never 3 but seem to be 0 and 1. They mayalso observe that the squares of the even numbers have remainder 0 and the squares ofthe odd numbers have remainder 1. The question then arises if this is evidence enough.Some students may at this point get the idea of trying to prove that any even numberhas a remainder 0 when divided by 4 and every odd number has a remainder 1 whendivided by 4. The proofs are easy:
(2n)2 = 4n2 and so (2n)2 ∼= 0 mod 4(2n+ 1)2 = 4n2 + 4n+ 1 and so (2n+ 1)2 ∼= 1 mod 4
Thus we have proved that the problem is impossible.Although this impossibility theorem will hardly in itself seem exciting to the studentsit may very well convince them that other problems like the classical problems canbe given similar but more complicated impossibility proofs. In this way a teacherhas succeeded to convince the students that impossibility can indeed be proved inmathematics. This may convince them that it is no longer a noble quest of intelligentpeople to try to solve the impossible in these cases but rather a futile quest of fools.And it will have shown the students how mathematics can in some sense deal with itsown limits using its own methods.
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